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The Deterrent Effects of Prison: Evidence from a
Natural Experiment
Francesco Drago
University of Naples Parthenope, Center for Studies in Economics and Finance, and Institute for
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Roberto Galbiati
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Pietro Vertova
University of Bergamo and Econpubblica, Bocconi University
The Collective Clemency Bill passed by the Italian Parliament in July
2006 represents a natural experiment to analyze the behavioral re-
sponse of individuals to an exogenous manipulation of prison sen-
tences. On the basis of a unique data set on the postrelease behavior
of former inmates, we find that 1 month less time served in prison
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commuted into 1 month more in expected sentence for future crimes
reduces the probability of recidivism by 0.16 percentage points. From
this result we estimate an elasticity of average recidivism with respect
to the expected punishment equal to 0.74 for a 7-month period.
I. Introduction
In modern criminal justice systems, imprisonment is the most important
form of sanction. Prisons have two basic functions. First, they incapac-
itate criminals from committing other crimes. Second, the threat of
being incarcerated, or the experience of incarceration, should deter
potential criminals from offending (Becker 1968). While the incapa-
citative effect of imprisonment is due to the mechanical removal of
criminals from society, its deterrent effect presumes that individuals
change their criminal behavior in response to the severity of prison
sentences. Policy makers often advocate the deterrent role of impris-
onment as an effective approach to crime reduction. However, under-
standing whether criminals do in fact respond to any policy changing
the incentives to commit a crime is problematic. The major problem is
that it is very difficult to observe an “exogenous” variation of prison
sentences at the individual level in reality.1
The Collective Clemency Bill2 passed by the Italian Parliament in July
2006 represents a unique opportunity to identify how people respond
to exogenous variations in prison sentences. This law provided for an
immediate 3-year reduction in detention for all inmates who had com-
mitted a crime before May 2, 2006. Upon the approval of the bill, almost
22,000 inmates—about 40 percent of the prison population of Italy—
were released from Italian prisons on August 1, 2006. The bill states
that if a former inmate recommits a crime within 5 years following his
release from prison, he will be required to serve the remaining sentence
suspended by the pardon (varying between 1 and 36 months) in addition
to the sentence given for the new crime.3 This is equivalent to a policy
manipulating incentives to commit a crime since it commutes 1 month
of time of the original sentence to be served in 1 month more of ex-
pected sentence for future crimes. More important, this institutional
framework manipulates prison sentences at the individual level in a
1 Levitt and Miles (2007) have recently surveyed the relevant empirical literature, noting
many of the critical issues hampering the identification of the effects of sanctions on
criminal behavior.
2 See Law 241/2006 in the Gazzetta Ufficiale of the Italian Republic, July 31, 2006.
3 Consider an individual who, having a residual sentence of 2 years to serve on July 31,
2006, is released from prison as a consequence of the Collective Clemency Bill. If he
recommits a crime within the 5 years following July 31, 2006, his expected sanction is
equal to the sanction for the new crime plus an additional sentence of 2 years of prison.
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random fashion. In particular, conditional on inmates’ original sen-
tences, the variation in the remaining sentence at the date of the pardon
(and hence in the expected sentence for any crime) depends only on
the date of an inmate’s entry into prison, which is plausibly as good as
random. A closer inspection of the data corroborates this intuition:
conditional on the original sentence length, inmates’ observable char-
acteristics are balanced for individuals below and above the median of
the remaining sentence.
We were granted access to the Italian Department of Prison Admin-
istration (DAP) database records on all the individuals released as a
result of the collective pardon law between August 1, 2006, and February
28, 2007. The full sample includes 25,814 individuals; 81 percent of the
sample is composed of prisoners released on August 1, 2006. For each
individual in the sample, in addition to a large set of variables at the
individual level, these data provide information on whether or not the
former inmate reoffended within the period between his release from
prison and February 28, 2007.
Using this data set, we exploit the variation in the remaining sentence
at the date of the pardon to identify how former inmates’ propensity
to recommit a crime responds to a policy that exogenously manipulates
prison sentences. Our results show that a marginal increase in the re-
maining sentence reduces the probability of recidivism by 0.16 per-
centage points (1.3 percent). This means that for former inmates, 1
month less time served in prison commuted into 1 month more in
expected sentence significantly reduces their propensity to recommit a
crime. By further inspecting our data, we can make some interesting
comparisons of the behavior of different categories of former inmates.
The effects we find are fairly homogeneous across inmates with different
individual characteristics. Only individuals convicted to relatively longer
sentences do not seem to be deterred, whereas foreign inmates are
slightly more responsive than Italians. Young individuals have a behav-
ioral response similar to that of adults.
This evidence allows us to make some considerations regarding both
policy and theory. First, prison sentences represent effective disincen-
tives to individuals’ criminal activity. In particular, a policy commuting
actual sentences in expected sentences significantly reduces recidivism.
This suggests that alternative approaches to incapacitation relying on
the behavioral response of criminals to disincentives to engage in crim-
inal activity may be effective in reducing crime. Second, given that ex-
isting estimates reveal a nonpositive effect of time served on recidivism
(Kuziemko 2007), we can draw some quantitative inferences on the
possible effect of expected sentences on propensity to recommit a crim-
inal act. For a 7-month period we estimate an elasticity in the propensity
to recommit a crime with respect to the average sentence that individuals
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expect equal to0.74. This means that increasing the expected sentence
by 50 percent should reduce recidivism rates by about 35 percent in 7
months.
This paper contributes to the literature providing evidence that po-
tential criminals do respond to a change in prison sentences. The nat-
ural experimental setting allows us to solve some fundamental problems
involved in identifying individuals’ response to a variation in the severity
of punishment, which is typically tested by analyzing how crime rates
are affected by an increase in criminal sanctions. When we register a
drop in crime rates following an increase in criminal sanctions, two
explanations compete: the discouragement of criminal behavior is in-
duced by the increase in its relative price (the deterrent effect), or the
reduction in crime is mechanically due to the removal of criminals from
the community (the incapacitation effect; Levitt 1996; Owens, forthcom-
ing).4 However, it is unclear how much of existing estimates of the effects
of an increase in prison sentences may be accounted for by the inca-
pacitation effect (Lee and McCrary 2005). By exploiting the exogenous
variation in prison sentences at the individual level generated by the
natural experiment, we identify the behavioral response of potential
criminals without any possible bias connected to the incapacitation ef-
fect and the endogenous response of policy makers.
The paper develops as follows. In Section II we discuss the related
literature. Section III presents the historical and political background
of the Clemency Bill approved in Italy in July 2006 and describes the
provisions of the bill in detail. Section IV provides the empirical analysis.
Section V presents concluding remarks.
II. Related Literature
Our paper relates to the literature studying the effect of the severity of
punishment on criminal activity.5 To understand this effect, most works
in this field have studied the effect of incarceration rates on aggregate
crime rates (Levitt 2004).6 For example, in an influential paper, Levitt
(1996) uses variation in the prison population induced by prison over-
crowding litigation to break the simultaneity of crime and incarceration,
4 Moreover, the identification of the deterrent effect of an increase in expected sanctions
is hampered by the fact that criminal sanctions may be endogenously determined. For
example, state and local governments may respond to high crime rates by hardening
criminal sanctions (Ehrlich 1973; Levitt 1998, 2004).
5 A second stream of empirical literature testing the theory of deterrence focuses on
the crime-reducing effects of the police. It is worth citing Marvell and Moody (1996),
Levitt (1997), Corman and Mocan (2000), and Di Tella and Schargrodsky (2004).
6 Most works in the literature use data from the United States. An exception is Marselli
and Vannini (1997), which is one of the first papers estimating the deterrent effect of
sanctions using aggregate data from Italy.
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finding that releasing one prisoner is associated with an increase of 15
crimes per year. This estimate, however, includes deterrence and inca-
pacitative effects. The strong evidence in support of incapacitation ef-
fects (see, e.g., Owens, forthcoming) urges further caution in attributing
a causal role to deterrence in such contexts. In a recent paper trying
to isolate deterrent effects, Kessler and Levitt (1999) exploit sentence
enhancements targeting the most frequent and dangerous criminals in
California. They argue that in the short run there should not be an
incapacitation effect after the law changes and find that some crime
rates fell by 4 percent after sentence enhancement, which, for example,
increased the sentence for any “serious” felony offender by 5 years. Levitt
(1998) evaluates the responsiveness of juvenile criminal activity to the
transition from the juvenile to the adult criminal justice system. In this
setting, data suggest that young offenders are at least as responsive to
expected punishment as adults. Katz, Levitt, and Shustorovich (2003)
take a different approach to estimating the deterrent effect of prison.
Rather than focusing on sentence enhancements that mechanically lead
to incapacitation effects on crime, they focus on the effect of harsh
prison conditions on crime rates at the state level in the United States.
By using death rates among prisoners as a proxy for prison conditions,
Katz et al. show that in the period 1950–90, states with more punitive
facilities experienced lower crime rates.
The use of aggregate data to test for the deterrent effect of prison
reflects the inherent difficulty of observing exogenous variation in
prison sentence at the individual level. In reality, variation in prison
sentence usually arises because of differences in criminal histories
among individuals (e.g., a former inmate usually expects a longer sen-
tence compared to somebody who has no history of dealings with the
judicial system), which makes the source of variation unattractive for
estimating the causal impact of prison sentence on criminal activity. Two
recent works in the literature exploit quasi-experimental variation in
sanctions. Lee and McCrary (2005) exploit the jump in expected sen-
tence length at age 18 in the United States. Using a regression discon-
tinuity design, they find only a very small behavioral response from
juveniles when they turn 18. The presence of self-control problems in
perceiving sanctions is the leading explanation for the small deterrent
effect of expected punishment. The paper casts doubts on the effec-
tiveness of expected punishment on the criminal activity of young in-
dividuals and suggests that previous estimates of deterrence based on
aggregate data are largely due to incapacitation effects. More in general,
the results of Lee and McCrary are indicative of the difficulty of de-
signing effective alternative approaches to incapacitation to reduce
crime. Helland and Tabarrok (2007) take advantage of the three strikes
legislation in California. They compare the postrelease behavior of crim-
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inals with two strikes with that of those who were tried for a second
strikeable offence but convicted of a nonstrikeable one. Conditional on
the assumption that former inmates in the two groups do not differ in
unobservable characteristics influencing future recidivism, they find that
those with two strikes substantially reduce their criminal activity.
Our paper is also related to recent contributions studying the effects
of prison treatment on recidivism. Chen and Shapiro (2007) use indi-
vidual-level data to estimate the effect of prison conditions on recidivism
rates. By exploiting a discontinuity in the assignment of federal prisoners
to security levels, they estimate that serving a sentence in higher security
levels implies a significantly higher postrelease propensity to commit a
crime. In a related paper, Hjalmarsson (forthcoming) capitalizes on
discontinuities in punishment that arise from Washington State’s juve-
nile sentencing guidelines to identify the effect of incarceration on the
postrelease criminal behavior of juveniles. Her results show that incar-
cerated individuals have lower propensities to be reconvicted of a crime.
Kling (2006) uses a variety of research designs to estimate the effect of
increases in incarceration length on the employment and earnings pros-
pects of individuals, finding no significant effects of time served. Ku-
ziemko (2007) exploits policy shocks and institutional features of the
prison system in Georgia (United States) and analyzes the effect of time
served on recidivism and the efficiency of a parole system versus a fixed-
sentences regime. She finds that the abolition of the parole system has
increased both per-prisoner costs and recidivism and that an additional
month of time served has a large negative effect on the propensity to
reoffend.
III. The Italian Collective Pardon and the Institutional Framework
Here we briefly describe the process by which inmates enter and are
released from correctional facilities in the Italian penal system and then
the motivations for and the provisions of the collective pardon law ap-
proved by the Italian Parliament in July 2006.
A. The Italian Sentencing System
Inmates enter a prison after having been arrested or after having been
sentenced. A fundamental constitutional guarantee7 provides that no-
body can be arrested and kept in prison for more than 48 hours without
the decision of a court. Pursuant to a court decision, inmates can enter
7 The individual freedom guarantee is stated in sec. I, art. 13, of the Italian Constitution,
which fixes the limit of 48 hours for detention unless it is decided by a court.
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the correctional facility system as a consequence of a trial8 leading to a
definitive conviction or, in some cases, before the definitive sentence
(i.e., while still on trial). More specifically, an individual can be kept in
jail before a definitive conviction only if he is officially charged and a
special court (Giudice per le Indagini Preliminari) identifies that there
is a danger that the defendant may recommit the same crime or pollute
evidence that could be used during the trial. These conditions are spe-
cifically designed to reduce the risk of incarcerating innocents. It is
worth noting that our data on arrests after the release from prison
following the collective clemency regard this kind of arrest as “con-
firmed” by the court.
In the Italian sentencing system, the Penal Code fixes a range of
sentences for each kind of offense, specifically providing minimum and
maximum sentences. In the case of conviction, the court fixes a sentence
length within the range established by the Penal Code. In fixing the
sentence length, the court must take into account the defendant’s crim-
inal history and his potential dangerousness according to the evidence
collected before and during the trial. When it comes to the process of
release from prison, inmates have the right to ask for probation. An
inmate can be given probation only as the result of the decision of a
specific court (Magistrato di Sorveglianza).9 The minimum proportions
of the original sentence that an inmate has to serve before being eligible
to ask for probation are fixed by law in the Italian Penal Code.10 The
Magistrato di Sorveglianza can grant probation only to those inmates
who have served this minimum and who have demonstrated progress
toward rehabilitation. The postrelease supervision of inmates on pro-
bation basically consists of the obligation to report to a police station
daily and of the obligation to communicate to the authorities any change
of residence. It is worth noting that those inmates released as a result
of the Collective Clemency Bill are not subject to any kind of postrelease
supervision.
8 The Italian criminal justice system is characterized by two levels of judgment: first trial
and appeal trial. A third level of judgment concerns the Supreme Court, which cannot
decide on the guilt or innocence of the defendant but can only check the correctness of
the trial procedure.
9 According to the Department of Prison Administration, the proportion of inmates on
probation is 5 percent of the total number (DAP 2008).
10 The cases in which probation can be granted are established by sec. 176 of the
Penal Code. Note that the general rule is that probation can be granted only to those
inmates who have already spent two-thirds of their original sentence in the correction
system.
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B. Motivation for the Collective Clemency Bill and Institutional
Background
In recent years the Italian prison system has been characterized by harsh
conditions of overcrowding. At the end of the 1990s, the total number
of inmates was 55,000 with a total of 42,000 available places; the average
overcrowding index was 131 inmates to 100 places in prison.11 This
situation became clear to the eye of public opinion in 2000, in particular
after a campaign promoted by the Catholic Church that started with
the visit of Pope John Paul II to Regina Coeli, one of the criminal
residential facilities in Rome. In the following months there was a huge
debate in the media, and several deputies in the Camera dei Deputati
(one of the two chambers of the Italian Parliament) tabled a bill pro-
posing an amnesty12 and a collective pardon.13 The public debate did
not lead to the passing of the bill, but the harsh situation in the prison
system remained under the media spotlight. The political debate gained
new strength after the official visit of Pope John Paul II to the Italian
Parliament.14 In his official speech he put great emphasis on the situ-
ation of prison inmates and suggested an amnesty. Despite this wide-
spread attention, the Italian Parliament passed the collective pardon
bill only 4 years later on July 30, 2006. The reasons for this delay can
be found in the exceptional nature of such a legislative measure. Ac-
cording to the Italian Constitution, any law providing for the imple-
mentation of an amnesty or a collective pardon must be approved by
both chambers of Parliament with a majority of two-thirds of the votes
regarding each article of the law (sec. II, art. 79, of the Italian Consti-
tution). These conditions are the same as those for the approval of a
constitutional reform (art. 138). In the following subsection we describe
the provisions of the collective pardon bill in greater detail.
C. Law 241/06, Collective Clemency Bill
The bill provides for a reduction in the length of detention for those
who committed a crime before May 2, 2006. This backdating of the
collective pardon, which was announced immediately when Parliament
began to debate the bill, rules out any possible effect of the collective
11 See Italian Department of Prison Administration, Statistics Office, http://www
.giustizia.it/statistiche/statistiche_dap/det/detg00_organigramma.htm.
12 The Italian juridical system makes a distinction between amnesty and collective par-
don. An amnesty extinguishes both the criminal record and the sanction. The collective
pardon shortens or eliminates sanctions but does not extinguish an individual criminal
record.
13 http://www.camera.it/_dati/leg13/lavori/stampati/sk7500/articola/7086.htm.
14 This official visit of the pope to the Parliament gained widespread media attention.
It was the first visit of a pope to the Parliament in the history of the Italian Republic.
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Fig. 1.—Number of prisoners in Italian facilities
pardon on crime rates during the months before the approval of the
measure. The legislative measure reduces prison sentences by 3 years
for a large number of inmates but does not extinguish the offense. As
a consequence, on August 1, 2006, all those with a residual prison sen-
tence of less than 3 years were immediately released from residential
facilities. Some types of crime are excluded from the collective pardon,
in particular those related to the mafia, terrorism, armed gangs, mas-
sacres, devastation and sacking, usury, felony sex crimes (in particular
against juveniles), kidnapping, and the exploitation of prostitution.
The provisions of the bill concerning the reduction of incarceration
length imply that every inmate convicted of a crime (other than those
listed above) committed before May 2, 2006, is eligible for immediate
release from prison as soon as his residual sentence becomes less than
3 years. Notice that the effects of the collective pardon will persist for
many years. For example, of inmates who had committed a crime before
May 2, 2006, those who had 3 years (or less) of detention in prison to
serve were immediately released on August 1, 2006; those who had 3
years and 1 month to serve were released on September 1, 2006; those
who had to serve exactly 20 years of further detention will be released
on August 1, 2023, instead of August 1, 2026. As a consequence of the
collective pardon, almost 37 percent of the inmates of Italian prisons
were released in the first 2 months: from 60,710 individuals on July 31,
2006, the total prison population dropped to 38,847 on August 1, 2006
(see fig. 1). The number of beneficiaries of the collective pardon is
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Fig. 2.—Number of released prisoners
decreasing over time. Indeed, on June 30, 2006, 19.2 percent of inmates
with a definitive sentence had to serve from 3 to 6 years in prison, 7.6
percent from 6 to 10 years, 6 percent from 10 to 20 years, and 4.5
percent more than 20 years or life imprisonment (see fig. 2).
As far as our research question is concerned, the crucial consequence
of the bill is the variation in prison sentences at the individual level (we
provide evidence consistent with the notion that this variation is ex-
ogenous in the next section). The bill provides that all those recom-
mitting a crime within the 5 years following July 31, 2006, and receiving
a further sentence greater than 2 years lose the benefit of the clemency.
This means that within the 5 years following their release from prison
as a result of the collective pardon, former inmates face an additional
expected sanction equal to the residual sentence pardoned by the bill.
Take for instance two criminals convicted with the same sentence and
having a residual sentence of less than 3 years on August 1, 2006. They
are both released from prison on August 1, 2006. Suppose that the first
individual entered prison 1 year before the other and has a pardoned
sentence of 1 year whereas the second has a pardoned residual sentence
of 2 years. In the following 5 years, for any possible kind of crime, they
face a difference in expected sentence of 1 year. For a robbery with a
maximum official expected sentence of 10 years, the first individual
expects a sentence of 11 years (10 years for the robbery plus 1 year
residual sentence pardoned by the Collective Clemency Bill), and the
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second expects a sentence of 12 years (10 years plus 2 years of residual
sentence).
IV. Empirical Results
A. Data
The source of data for this study is an internal database that the Italian
DAP maintains on offenders under its care. We were granted access to
the DAP database records on all the individuals released as a result of
the collective pardon law between August 1, 2006, and February 28,
2007. The full sample includes 25,813 individuals; 81 percent were re-
leased on August 1, 2006. For each individual, the data provide infor-
mation on whether or not he or she reoffends within the period between
release from prison and February 28, 2007. This means that for most
of the individuals the data report recidivism in the first 7 months after
release from prison. Moreover, the data set contains information con-
cerning a large set of variables at the individual and facility levels. For
each individual, information is reported on the facility where the sen-
tence was served, the official length of the sentence, the actual time
served in the facility, the kind of crime committed (i.e., the last crime
committed in the individual’s criminal history), age, sex, level of edu-
cation, marital status, nationality, province of residence, employment
status before being sentenced to prison, and whether the individual had
a final sentence or was waiting for the first verdict or for the result of
an appeal at the date of release. As data on subsequent convictions are
not available, we use a subsequent criminal charge and imprisonment
as the measure for recidivism.
Our analysis is restricted to people serving their sentence in prison;
that is, we exclude from the analysis individuals convicted to serve a
sentence in a judiciary mental hospital (98 individuals). Moreover, we
exclude from the sample any individual with a residual sentence higher
than 36 months. This is the case of individuals cumulating different
charges with a sentence for at least one but awaiting verdicts on others.
We do not consider individuals for whom sentence data are missing.
Because we want to perform the empirical analysis with a sample that
is homogeneous along both the date of release and the length of window
(7 months), we exclude individuals with a residual sentence equal to
36 months. We do not know the exact date of release of each inmate,
but we know that any other inmate released after August 1, 2006, nec-
essarily had a residual sentence of 36 months. The final sample used
in the empirical investigation is made up of 20,950 individual-level ob-
servations. In column 1 of table 1, descriptive statistics on the individual-
level data are reported. Those reoffending constitute 11.5 percent of
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TABLE 1
Individual Characteristics for Residual Sentences Above and Below the
Median (N p 20,950)
Mean
Difference
(4)
Whole
Sample
(1)
Residual
Sentence
below the
Median
(2)
Residual
Sentence
above the
Median
(3)
Original sentence (in
months) 38.982 39.089 38.891 .198
(.225) (.306) (.325) (.447)
Residual sentence (in
months) 14.511 8.475 19.730 11.255
(.070) (.063) (.093) (.113)
Recidivism .115 .129 .102 .027
(.002) (.003) (.003) (.004)
Age on exit 38.764 38.762 38.766 .004
(.069) (.104) (.102) (.146)
Married .284 .275 .292 .017
(.003) (.005) (.004) (.006)
Permanently employed .339 .342 .337 .006
(.005) (.007) (.007) (.010)
Percentage of males .954 .957 .951 .006
(.001) (.002) (.002) (.003)
Share of Italians .621 .595 .643 .048
(.003) (.005) (.004) (.007)
First judgment taken .998 .999 .998 .001
(.001) (.001) (.001) (.001)
Area of residence:
North .425 .425 .425 .000
(.003) (.005) (.005) (.007)
Center .185 .182 .187 .005
(.003) (.004) (.004) (.005)
South .378 .380 .377 .004
(.003) (.005) (.005) (.007)
Education:
Compulsory .901 .907 .898 .008
(.003) (.004) (.004) (.005)
High school .079 .076 .082 .007
(.002) (.003) (.003) (.005)
College (degree or
equivalent) .009 .008 .010 .002
(.001) (.001) (.001) (.002)
Kind of offense:
Drug offenses .404 .412 .398 .014
(.003) (.005) (.005) (.007)
Crime against property .412 .416 .408 .008
(.003) (.005) (.005) (.007)
Crimes against public
safety .005 .005 .005 .000
(.000) (.001) (.001) (.000)
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TABLE 1
(Continued)
Mean
Difference
(4)
Whole
Sample
(1)
Residual
Sentence
below the
Median
(2)
Residual
Sentence
above the
Median
(3)
Gun law .012 .011 .013 .002
(.001) (.001) (.001) (.001)
Immigration bill .029 .030 .028 .002
(.001) (.002) (.002) (.002)
Violent crimes .094 .092 .098 .006
(.002) (.003) (.003) (.004)
Note.—Standard errors are in parentheses. Robust standard errors are in col. 4. Column 1 reports summary statistics
for the whole sample. Columns 2 and 3 report summary statistics for the sample divided in evenly sized groups as
follows. For each group of inmates with the same original sentence length, the median of the residual sentence is
calculated. Column 2 reports summary statistics for those observations in which the residual sentence is below the
median for that original sentence length, and col. 3 reports summary statistics for those observations in which the
residual sentence is above the median for that original sentence length. Column 4 reports the point estimates of the
differences between the means in cols. 2 and 3.
the sample. Most of the sample is composed of males (95 percent) and
Italians (62 percent). The average age on exit is 38.76 years. Only 28
percent are married, and 34 percent were permanently employed before
entering prison; 90 percent had attended compulsory schooling. The
average residual sentence—varying between 1 and 35 months—is equal
to 14.51 months, whereas the average original sentence is about 39
months. The variation in the original sentence length is large. There
are individuals with a sentence longer than 360 months who were con-
victed for violent crimes (e.g., murder) as well as individuals with very
short sentence lengths. The majority of the sample were convicted for
crimes against property or offenses related to the drug law. The Ap-
pendix provides a description of the crimes included in the different
categories. Some crime categories (e.g., mafia, terrorism, and felony sex
crimes) are missing from our sample because they were excluded from
the collective pardon.
To provide evidence consistent with the hypothesis that, conditional
on original sentence, the residual sentence is as good as a random
variable, in columns 2 and 3 of table 1 we report summary statistics for
those observations in which the residual sentence is above the median
for that original sentence length and those observations in which the
residual sentence is below the median for that original sentence length.
In column 4 we report the differences in the means for each of the
observable characteristics. This is equivalent to a test of observables
being balanced for individuals with a residual sentence above and below
the median after conditioning on the original sentence. Considering
the large sample size, it appears that observables are remarkably similar.
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A few differences are statistically distinguishable from zero (sex, marital
status, and drug offense), but all point estimates in column 4 are ex-
tremely small and well below 5 percent of a standard deviation from
the mean for each observable characteristic. There is an exception.
Italians are overrepresented by 4.8 percentage points in the group of
those inmates with a residual sentence above the median (the point
estimate of 0.048 is 9.5 percent of the standard deviation from the mean
of the share of Italians).15 In the regression analysis, splitting the sample
between Italians and non-Italians, we observe that the effect of the re-
sidual sentence on recidivism is large and precisely estimated for both
groups of inmates (differential effects are presented in subsec. F). More-
over, when we control for being Italian (as well as for nationality fixed
effects) and for all the observables, results remain essentially unchanged.
From table 1 we also observe that the average recidivism of former
inmates with a residual sentence below and above the median is 0.129
and 0.102, respectively, which indicates that former inmates with longer
residual sentences have an average recidivism about 25 percent lower
than that of those with shorter residual sentences.
B. Graphical Evidence
To provide a graphical representation of the last piece of evidence pre-
sented above (i.e., former inmates with residual sentence above the
median reoffend less, conditional on the original sentence length), in
figure 3 we report the recidivism rate for each sentence for former
inmates with residual sentences both above and below the median. In
doing this we report only sentence groups between 23 and 43 months,
which is the range of sentences to which most individuals are convicted.
As is clear from figure 3, the recidivism rate for individuals with residual
sentences above the median is systematically lower for each sentence.
In particular, for this group of inmates, the average residual sentences
are equal to 9.34 and 23.46 months for inmates with residual sentences
below and above the median, respectively. The average recidivism of the
former group is 13.12 percent and that of the other group is of 9.69
percent. Overall, figure 3 shows preliminary evidence that former in-
mates respond to higher residual sentences by reducing their criminal
activity.
15 A closer inspection of the data revealed that this result is mostly driven by three
national groups: Moroccans, Tunisians, and Algerians. In addition, this problem of dif-
ferential entry into prison is restricted to those inmates who entered Italian prisons be-
tween July 2005 and July 2006.
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Fig. 3.—Residual sentence and recidivism. Black bars represent average recidivism for
individuals with residual sentences below the median conditional on the original sentence,
and white bars represent average recidivism for individuals with residual sentences above
the median conditional on the original sentence.
C. Regression Analysis
Denote by the postrelease outcome of an individual i, withyi
his initial sentence and his residual sentence16 in thesentence sentresi i
month he is released pursuant to the collective clemency bill. The post-
release outcome we observe is whether or not former inmates reoffend
( takes the value one if the individual was rearrested in the periodyi
under consideration and zero otherwise). The basic regression model
is
y p a b sentence  b sentres   . (1)i 0 i 1 i i
The identifying assumption needed to obtain a consistent estimate of
the coefficient of interest b1 is that, conditional on sentence length,
variation in the residual sentence is not systematically correlated to
variation in unobservables that affect the postrelease outcome, that is,
16 Throughout the analysis both sentence (the original sentence) and sentres (the re-
sidual pardoned sentence) are expressed in months.
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TABLE 2
Baseline Results
(1) (2) (3)
Residual sentence .0016 .0017 .0017
(6.54) (6.87) (7.02)
Original sentence .0001 .0002 .0002
(1.93) (2.22) (2.61)
Individual characteristics No Yes Yes
Type of crime No No Yes
Pseudo 2R .005 .028 .032
Observations 20,950 19,316 19,316
Note.—Logit estimates are reported. The dependent variable is equal to one if the individual returned to
prison after release and zero otherwise. Coefficients are marginal effects evaluated at the mean of the independent
variables. Robust Z-statistics are in parentheses. Individual variables include education levels, age at the date of
release, a dummy indicating marital status, nationality, juridical status, and employment condition before
imprisonment.
.17 This hypothesis is supported by theCov (sentres , Fsentence )p 0i i i
results presented in table 1 and discussed in the previous section.
Table 2 reports the results. In column 1 we present the results of
model (1) estimated with a logit regression. The coefficients reported
are marginal effects evaluated at the mean of the independent variables.
Standard errors are robust. The coefficient for the residual sentence is
negative and precisely estimated: an additional month in the residual
sentence decreases the probability of recidivism by 0.16 percentage
points (about 1.3 percent). In column 2 we report the results of the
basic regression model, which includes a set of individual characteristics
such as age, sex, nationality, education, marital status, employment
dummy, and juridical status. In column 3 results of a model that includes
both individual characteristics and type of crime committed before re-
lease are presented. As columns 2 and 3 show, the effect of the residual
sentence is essentially the same as that reported in column 1.18 Given
that the number of individuals who commit a criminal act but are not
arrested is likely to be much higher than the number of individuals who
are arrested but have not committed a criminal act, the estimated impact
17 This assumption can also be stated by saying that the determinants that led individuals
with a sentence equal to T months to enter prison in any month in the interval [T
before August 2006 are orthogonal to the probability of recidivism.36, T]
18 Results remain unchanged when we estimate conditional logit models grouped by
province of residence fixed effects, national group fixed effects, and prison fixed effects.
Province of residence fixed effects absorb unobserved heterogeneity across police juris-
dictions that may influence the probability of being rearrested. Prison fixed effects and
national group fixed effects take account of fixed differences across prisons and nation-
alities that drive criminal behavior.
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of the residual sentence should be interpreted as a lower bound of the
effect of the residual sentence.19
D. Deterrent Effects of Prison Sentences
By construction, the residual sentence is equal to the sentence minus
the number of months served in prison, which means that time served,
residual sentence, and original sentence are collinear. Hence, the es-
timated effect on recidivism has to be interpreted as the joint deterrent
effect of an additional month in the expected sentence and of 1 month
less served in prison (i.e., the effect of the policy that commutes 1 month
of the actual sentence to be served to 1 month of the expected sentence
for future crimes). While the nature of the basic experiment does not
allow us to separately identify the impact of the expected sentence on
recidivism, it is possible to make some quantitative inferences on this
effect given that existing estimates reveal a nonpositive impact of time
served on recidivism (Kuziemko 2007).20
Assuming a zero effect of time served on recidivism, a reduction of
0.16 percentage points in the probability of recidivism (see table 2)
implies an elasticity of the average recidivism rate to expected punish-
ment (considering the average original sentence plus the average re-
sidual sentence) of 0.74. This means that when expected sentences
are increased by, for example, 25 percent, the propensity to reoffend
in 7 months should decrease by about 18 percent. We do not have data
on the average recidivism rate after 12 months, but we know that the
recidivism rate after 17 months was 22 percent (see the next subsection).
Hence, considering the estimated effect and an annual average recid-
ivism rate between 0.18 and 0.20, we would have an elasticity of the
19 Note that in Italy incarceration before conviction is an extreme measure that generally
occurs only when there is the evident risk of reiteration of crime and the possibility of
counterfeiting of evidence. In the first 6 months of 2008, only 20 percent of criminal
trials in Italy concluded with the acquittal of the defendant (“Rapporto sul processo penale
in Italia,” Unione Camere Penali Italiane; data collected by the Italian union of criminal
attorneys). Moreover, to give an idea of how many criminal acts do not result in arrests
in Italy, in 2006 police did not find the offender for about 78 percent of criminal acts
reported (Relazione sull’attivita` giudiziaria nell’anno 2006, p. 22; data come from the Italian
Supreme Court).
20 As Kuziemko (2007) mentions, existing estimates of time served on recidivism are
plagued by endogeneity problems but appear to be close to zero. In her study, using
individual data from the state of Georgia, she exploits a mass release in the 1970s that
generated exogenous variation in time served. She finds that inmates serving a longer
period in prison have a significantly lower propensity to recommit a criminal act. She
estimates that serving an extra month in prison reduces the probability of recidivism by
about 7 percent. Rehabilitation programs or a simple specific deterrent effect of previous
time served can explain these results (the concept of specific deterrence refers to the
effect that the previous punishment has on the probability of committing a crime). In a
recent paper, Maurin and Ouss (2009) obtain similar results exploiting data from the
French Bastille Day pardon.
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average recidivism rate with respect to sentence length between 0.43
and 0.47. This elasticity is even larger than existing estimates of the
elasticity of crime with respect to imprisonment that includes the effect
of expected punishment and incapacitation on criminal activity. The
biggest estimates of the elasticity of the annual crime rate with respect
to the prison population are provided by Levitt (1996), who finds elas-
ticities of 0.40 and 0.30 for violent and property crimes, respectively.
This estimate, however, includes both an incapacitation and a deterrent
effect. Although it is difficult to make quantitative comparisons with
previous studies relying on U.S. aggregate data, a presumable annual
elasticity between 0.43 and 0.47 does seem large compared to this
evidence.
E. Short-Time Period
One issue meriting discussion is the relatively short period (7 months)
over which we observe former inmates. Some of the concerns with this
time period are addressed by the fact that considering only inmates
released on August 1, 2006, we have a sample homogeneous along both
the date of release and the length of the window. However, even under
the assumption that the residual sentence is a variable as good as ran-
dom, our estimates would be upward biased if some former inmates
recommitted a crime only after the 7-month period in a way that the
proportion of recidivists with a longer residual sentence increases over
time. While it is not possible to completely rule out this hypothesis, we
can provide evidence suggesting that, in fact, it is unlikely that the results
overestimate the effect of the residual sentence. Individual data are not
available (to researchers) for a longer time span, but the DAP has pro-
vided some aggregate descriptive statistics on recidivists for the total of
former inmates released as a result of the Collective Clemency Bill until
December 31, 2007 (hence for a period of 17 months). As we report
in table 3, the recidivism rate after 17 months is 22 percent, hence about
double that after 7 months (DAP 2008). It appears that almost all the
means of the primary observable characteristics reported by the DAP
for the recidivists after 17 months are more or less double those that
we calculated after 7 months, which suggests that the means of observ-
ables of recidivists remain quite stable over time. A drastic change in
the observable variables of recidivists after 17 months would have created
the suspicion that some categories of individuals recommit crime only
in the long run. Overall, table 3 provides evidence consistent with the
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TABLE 3
Recidivism Rates
Recidivism after
7 Months (Mean)
(1)
Recidivism after
17 Months (Mean)
(2)
Whole sample .11 .22
Males .12 .23
Females .05 .11
Italians .11 .20
Non-Italians .11 .19
Kind of offense:
Drug offenses .10 .21
Crime against property .14 .26
Immigration bill .09 .21
Violent crimes .09 .24
Note.—Column 1 reports summary statistics for recidivists in our sample for those released in August 2006
for a 7-month period. Column 2 reports summary statistics of recidivists calculated on all beneficiaries of the
Collective Clemency Bill for a 17-month period (as of December 31, 2007).
hypothesis that it is unlikely that with a longer period our results would
change dramatically.21
F. Differential Effects
We now investigate whether the deterrent effect varies across inmates
with different characteristics. To begin, we explore whether former in-
mates with different original sentences are differentially deterred by
their future sentence. Table 4 presents the results for individuals
grouped by quartile of original sentence distribution (1–18, 19–34, 35–
50, and 51–368). In the four groups of inmates, we do not observe
behavioral responses that are statistically different from each other. The
groups appear to be equally deterred. Given that the last quartile in-
cludes individuals with moderately long sentences and very long sen-
tences, we investigated whether individuals with an original sentence
21 Another potential issue concerns how the police target released potential criminals.
Suppose that the police believe that individuals with higher residual sentences are less
likely to commit a crime. If in addition the police have an incentive to increase the number
of arrests, they could direct their efforts toward individuals with lower residual sentences.
In this case we would overestimate the deterrent effect of expected sanctions. This ex-
planation requires that the police know the residual sentences of former inmates and
discriminate between potential criminals on this basis. Even if one is willing to assume
that the police are well informed about former inmates and do discriminate, there is a
general equilibrium effect induced by this potential police behavior that should compen-
sate for the difference in the probability of being arrested for individuals with long and
short residual sentences. Indeed, those former inmates with long residual sentences would
increase their criminal activity in response to a lower relative cost of crime (because if
the police target individuals with short residual sentences, those with long residual sen-
tences face a lower probability of being arrested). Note that this effect goes in the opposite
direction of what we find in the data.
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TABLE 4
Differential Effects by Original Sentence
Quartile 1 Quartile 2 Quartile 3 Quartile 4
Residual sentence .0023 .0017 .0013 .0013
(1.55) (2.83) (3.02) (3.46)
Original sentence .0020 .0012 .0001 .0002
(1.60) (1.18) (1.03) (2.05)
Individual characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Type of crime Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo 2R .028 .032 .034 .051
Average recidivism .133 .122 .105 .098
Observations 4,965 4,752 4,859 4,740
Note.—Logit estimates are reported. The dependent variable is equal to one if the individual returned to prison
after release and zero otherwise. Coefficients are marginal effects evaluated at the mean of the independent variables.
Robust Z-statistics are in parentheses. Individual variables include education levels, age at the date of release, a dummy
indicating marital status, nationality, juridical status, and employment condition before imprisonment. The first quartile
includes individuals with sentences less than 19 months; the second, sentences between 19 and 34 months; the third,
sentences between 35 and 50 months; and the fourth, sentences above 50 months.
longer than 69 months (this is the median sentence in the last quartile;
the average recidivism for inmates with original sentences above and
below 69 months is 0.097 and 0.100, respectively) have the same be-
havioral response to the remaining sentences. For these inmates it ap-
pears that this behavioral response is very small and is estimated with
large standard errors (results not reported in the table).22 As the original
sentence should reflect the seriousness of the crime committed, this
finding suggests that the more dangerous inmates are not deterred.
In columns 1 and 2 of table 5, we explore whether women and men
have a different behavioral response to the expected punishment.
Women have a much lower recidivism rate (0.046) than men (0.118),
and it appears that the impact of the residual sentence is lower. However,
the difference in the coefficients for men and women is not statistically
different from zero at conventional levels. Instead, the data suggest that
Italians are less responsive than foreign inmates (cols. 3 and 4), who
represent about 40 percent of the total of former inmates compared
with only 5 percent of the total population. In columns 5 and 6 we
observe that there is no difference in response between former inmates
initially convicted for violent and property crimes.
An important issue in the literature is whether young individuals are
as responsive to expected punishment as adults. Levitt (1998) finds
evidence consistent with the fact that there is little difference in how
adults and juveniles respond to expected punishment. Lee and McCrary
(2005) document a very small response to expected punishment from
juveniles of age 18. Having individuals who are former inmates, we
cannot observe very young individuals of age 18. However, it is inter-
22 The coefficient is 0.0006 with a robust Z-statistic equal to 1.11. This coefficient is
statistically different from the coefficients reported in table 4.
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esting to compare how older and younger inmates behave in our sample.
In the bottom panel of table 5, we report the coefficients on the residual
sentence for individuals grouped by quartile of age distribution. All four
groups seem to be deterred. Only the third group, aged between 38
and 44, has a higher and statistically different response compared to
the three other groups. We also observed that individuals aged less than
25 have a behavioral response that is not statistically different from that
of older inmates. Although the outside options or the key drivers of
criminal activity are arguably different for individuals of different ages
(as appears from the large differences in the average recidivism rates),
it seems that the response of these individuals to an increase in the
threat of future punishment is the same. More generally, from this
analysis we note that for groups with very different recidivism rates, we
do not find statistically significant differences in response to expected
punishment. The few differences regard groups with very similar recid-
ivism rates (e.g., Italians and foreign inmates, or inmates with an original
sentence length less than or equal to 69 and longer than 69 months).
V. Concluding Remarks
In this paper we contribute to the empirical literature on the study of
criminal punishment by providing evidence that individuals vary their
criminal activity in response to a change in prison sentences. Our re-
search design exploits the natural experiment provided by the Collective
Clemency Bill passed by the Italian Parliament in July 2006. The insti-
tutional features of the bill imply, for all the individuals released upon
the approval of the bill, an exogenous variation in prison sentences at
the individual level. This experimental setting allows us to identify the
deterrent effect of a change in prison sentences separately from its
incapacitation effect and from the possible endogenous reactions of
policy makers to crime.
Our findings show that a policy that commutes actual sentences in
expected sentences significantly reduces inmates’ recidivism. Moreover,
the results provide credible evidence that a 1-month increase in ex-
pected punishment lowers the probability of committing a crime. This
corroborates the theory of general deterrence. The results indicate a
large deterrent effect of expected punishment. However, from a policy
perspective, caution should be used in concluding that sentences should
be increased for any kind of crime. Indeed, it is not clear whether these
results can be extended to individuals who have never received prison
treatment. Finally, without the provision in the bill that introduces the
mechanism of residual sentences, recidivism rates would have been
much higher. This suggests that inmates given probation should have
a lower propensity to recommit a crime, given that if they reoffend, they
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have to serve the remaining sentence in addition to the new sentence.
If, on the one hand, a longer time served might reduce the risk of
recidivism (Kuziemko 2007), on the other hand, the threat of a longer
sentence also decreases it. Future works should address whether the
benefits of granting some inmates probation outweigh the cost associ-
ated with the risk that these former inmates will reoffend.
Appendix
Description of the Categories of Crime
Drug offenses: In this category are included all the violations of the law on the
use and selling of drugs (Decree of the President of the Republic, October 9,
1990, number 309, and subsequent modifications and amendments).
Crimes against property: In this category are included theft, larceny, robbery,
bag snatching, and in general all the offenses regulated by book II, section XIII,
of the Italian Penal Code.
Crimes against public safety: In this category are included all crimes related to
possible danger to the safety of people, things, public utilities, and buildings.
All the crimes in this category are included in book II, section VI, of the Italian
Penal Code.
Gun law: In this category are included all the violations of the law on using
and carrying guns and other arms (Law 110/75 and subsequent modifications
and amendments).
Immigration bill: In this category are included all the violations of the law on
the regulation of immigration and the juridical status of foreign citizens (Law
July 25, 1998, n. 286, and subsequent amendments and modifications).
Violent crimes: In this category are included assault, homicide, and in general
all the offenses regulated by book II, section XII, of the Italian Penal Code.
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